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The main objective of this paper is to rethink the use 
of market discipline for prudential purposes in light of 
lessons from the financial crisis. The paper develops the 
main building blocks of a market discipline framework, 
and argues for the need to take an expansive view of the 
concept. It also illustrates using actual  bank case studies 
from the United States its apparent failures in the crisis, 
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particularly the failure to prevent the buildup of systemic, 
as opposed to idiosyncratic, risks. However, while the role 
of market discipline in the design of macro-prudential 
regulation appears to be largely constrained, more can 
be done on the micro-prudential side to promote clearer 
market signals of bank riskiness and to encourage their 
use in the supervisory process. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The use of market discipline (MD) for prudential purposes has gained importance in recent 
years as policymakers have increasingly recognized its role and incorporated it in their 
regulatory frameworks. This is exemplified by the codification of MD as one of the three pillars 
in the supervisory architecture for internationally active banks (Basel II) and insurance 
companies (Solvency II).  
 
However, the global financial crisis has exposed important limitations of MD and has cast 
doubts on its underlying premise of efficient markets and on its effectiveness as a prudential 
mechanism. In fact, several commentators
1 have expressed their dismay with the way that market 
participants did not identify and sufficiently punish (at least on an ex ante basis) those banks that 
took excessive risks and subsequently failed or had to be rescued at great cost to taxpayers. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to rethink the use of MD for prudential purposes in light 
of the financial crisis. There are two key conclusions stemming from the analysis. First, there is a 
need to take an expansive view of MD that includes key elements of a modern market-based 
system whose existence, at least until recently, was taken for granted in developed countries. 
Second, empirical evidence presented in the paper suggests that MD failed to exert itself 
sufficiently early to prevent the buildup of systemic, as opposed to idiosyncratic, risks during the 
‘good times’. Of course, once the crisis took hold, MD seems to have played its role broadly as 
expected, with banks perceived to be weaker being punished more severely than stronger ones.  
 
Both conclusions carry important policy implications. Recognition of the need for a more 
expansive view of MD would imply significant reforms in the way that the concept is currently 
treated in the prudential framework, which focuses predominantly on transparency and 
disclosure. On the other hand, the inability of MD to adequately address systemic risk means that 
its role in the design of any future macro-prudential regulation will likely be severely 
constrained. However, more can be done on the micro-prudential side to promote clearer market 
signals of bank riskiness and to encourage their use in the supervisory process.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: 
  Section II reviews the existing literature on this concept and develops an analytical 
framework that captures the main building blocks of MD; 
  Section III illustrates with the use of actual bank case studies, and attempts to explain 
using the analytical framework, the apparent failures of MD in this crisis; 
  Section IV briefly describes crisis-induced policy reforms currently under way that 
would affect the functioning of MD, and explores additional ways to improve it so 
that it can support – to the extent possible – prudential objectives; and 
  Section V summarizes the main findings and draws some policy implications on the 
value and limitations of this concept.  
                                                 
1 For example, the U.K. Financial Services Authority (March 2009) challenges the efficient market theory upon 
which MD is predicated and states that “the events of the last five years have illustrated the inadequacy of market 
discipline: indeed, they suggest that in some ways, market prices and market pressures may have played positively 
harmful roles”. See also Roubini (March 2008) and De Grauwe (December 2008).  
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The definition varies in the literature but, in its broadest terms, MD is the mechanism via 
which market participants monitor and discipline excessive risk-taking behavior by banks. As 
some commentators have pointed out
2, MD has less to do with the market per se and more about 
the institutional framework – information, incentives, and control – used to reduce the problems 
of moral hazard and asymmetric information that are endemic in banking. 
 
MD has recently been playing a greater role on prudential matters as well. It has become 
increasingly important with the development of capital markets, globalization, conglomeration, 
and innovation that have limited the ability of supervisors to adequately monitor banks given 
their increasing size, cross-border activities and complexity. Under this viewpoint, official 
supervisory action and MD are seen as complementary and self-reinforcing. Bank regulation 
stems from the twin objectives of protecting retail depositors and avoiding the substantial 
welfare costs associated with the systemic effects of a bank failure. However, banks might not be 
adequately disciplined – at least on an ex ante basis – by official supervision. This can arise from 
unavoidable informational asymmetries between the bank and its supervisor, or because of 
forbearance due to political considerations or other reasons (e.g. weak legal protection of 
supervisors). The existence of market participants with the resources, expertise and incentives to 
monitor banks provides an additional tool of discipline that complements official supervision and 
may also limit forbearance (i.e. supervisory discipline). Taken together, appropriate regulations 
can enhance the disciplining power of markets, while market signals can provide relevant 
information and incentives for bank and supervisory actions.  
 
Some commentators and policymakers have gone beyond this viewpoint and asserted that 
MD can actually replace financial market regulation and supervision to a certain extent. In fact, 
the regulatory philosophy in several developed countries had relied heavily over the last two 
decades on the self-correcting properties of markets and the self-interest of sophisticated 
financial institutions. This set of beliefs supported a financial deregulation trend that was 
exemplified by less intrusive supervision, the lack of new regulations on rapidly growing 
unregulated financial players (e.g. hedge funds) and instruments/markets (e.g. over-the-counter 
derivatives), the dependence of new prudential rules on market-based measures of risk (e.g. 
capital requirements in Basel II), and the reduction in existing regulatory restrictions (e.g. the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S. in 1999, allowing commercial banks to fully enter the 
securities business). 
 
The increased emphasis on MD is exemplified by its codification in recent international 
prudential standards, such as Pillar 3 in the Basel II Framework (and more recently in Solvency 
II)
3. It is interesting to note that the Basel II document does not even define MD, even though it 
                                                 
2 Hellwig (October 2005) views MD as part of the wider discussion on corporate finance and corporate governance, 
specifically as another manifestation of the ‘banks versus markets’ debate. He attributes the eminence of the term on 
the emotional appeal of its association with markets and the market-based system rather than on the analytical rigor 
of the concept.  
3 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June 2006) for details.  
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mandates various types of information disclosures by banks to strengthen it. The main objectives 
of Pillar 3 are to complement the other two Pillars by enabling market participants to obtain key 
qualitative and quantitative information on banks’ capital, risk profile, and risk assessment 
processes in a consistent and comparable format
4. Implementation experience to-date has been 
mixed, with some supervisors taking a hands-off approach – at least until the onset of the 
financial crisis – by arguing that Pillar 3 disclosures are something that banks and market 
participants need to work out between themselves.  
 
The implicit assumption underlying the use of MD for prudential purposes is that most 
banking problems are idiosyncratic and associated with principal-agent frictions stemming from 
information asymmetries and inadequate contract enforcement that generate moral hazard and 
lead to excessively risky behavior. In those situations, it is argued that MD can better align the 
incentives of the agents with those of the principals by enabling the latter to more effectively 
discipline the former. Some authors had already pointed out that MD does not work well in 
environments in which systemic factors dominate idiosyncratic risk
5, but this was not considered 
to be an issue for countries with developed financial systems and stable macroeconomic policies. 
 
It is also important to conceptually distinguish different types of MD. Direct MD refers to the 
control or influence that market participants themselves can exert on a bank’s risk-taking 
behavior. By contrast, indirect MD is brought about by regulatory intervention triggered by 
market signals (e.g. price movements of bank securities). Moreover, one can view bank runs, 
share price collapses, forced takeovers, and class action lawsuits as forms of ex post MD; 
however, for the concept to fulfill its prudential purpose, MD also needs to operate preemptively 





While the concept itself is intuitive, the mechanisms by which MD can function under 
different financial system structures and institutional contexts remain unclear. The existing 
broad, albeit fragmented
6, literature on MD describes the concept and its application in specific 
instances, emphasizing the need for disclosures, providing incentives to monitor via a properly 
designed safety net, and strengthening private property rights. However, beyond these high-level 
(and generally irrefutable) objectives, there is relatively little guidance on how much to rely on 
and on how to operationalize the concept under different financial system structures and 
institutional environments – what Llewellyn (March 2005) calls the ‘black box’ of MD. This 
makes it difficult for policymakers to ascertain the limitations of MD given their specific market 
and institutional characteristics, and to design a comprehensive set of policies to promote it. 
                                                 
4 Bank management can determine the appropriate medium and location of disclosures – for example, as part of 
accounting or other statutory disclosure requirements (e.g. for publicly-listed firms) or via other means (e.g. 
websites or public regulatory reports). Pillar 3 disclosures are not required to be audited by an external auditor 
unless otherwise required by accounting or other regulatory authorities. 
5 See Levy Yeyati et al (October 2004) for a study of depositor behavior during the systemic bank runs in Argentina 
and Uruguay in 2000-02. They illustrate that as systemic risk increases, the informational content of bank 
fundamentals declines, indicating that the notion of MD needs to account for systemic risk in emerging economies. 
6 There are various different – and not always connected – strands in the literature (e.g. design of safety nets, 




In an attempt to overcome this problem and to facilitate the analysis in this paper, an MD 
framework has been developed (see Figure 1). In the context of a given macroeconomic 
environment and financial system structure, it comprises four interrelated building blocks: 
a.  Building block 1: Information and disclosure – the public availability of adequate, 
timely, consistent and reliable information on the bank’s financial performance and 
risk exposures 
b.  Building block 2: Market participants – the existence of independent market 
participants with the incentives to monitor the bank and the ability to accurately 
process the information that it discloses 
c.  Building block 3: Discipline mechanisms – the various instruments, whether 
financial, legal, or supervisory (indirect MD), that market participants can use to 
exercise discipline 
d.  Building block 4: Internal governance – the organizational and compensation 
structures that determine whether insiders (senior management and Board of 
Directors) understand and control the risks that the bank is taking, and are 
incentivized to change their behavior in response to market signals. 
 




The framework is primarily based on the existing literature on this topic. For example, 
Crockett (2002) mentions four preconditions for MD to be effective in ensuring financial 
stability: sufficient information, ability to process it correctly, right incentives, and existence of 
mechanisms to exercise discipline. Scott (2004) formulates three general requirements for an 
acceptable level of MD: a market in the financial instruments of the issuer, enforceable credit  
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contracts, and a market for corporate control. Llewellyn (March 2005) identifies information, the 
abundance of ‘stakeholder monitors’ with the interest and right incentives to monitor a bank, 
efficient markets through which price and quantity adjustments can take place, and appropriate 
incentives for bank management to adjust their behavior in response to such signals. Bliss and 
Flannery (March 2001) introduces two distinct components to the MD concept: the ability of 
investors to evaluate a firm’s true condition (monitoring), and the responsiveness of firm 
managers to investor feedback as reflected in security prices (influence). Similarly, Hamalainen 
et al. in Kaufman (ed., 2003) distinguish between a recognition phase and a control phase for 
effective MD, each with its own conditions.  
 
As can be seen, the framework is fairly broad in scope and covers areas where conventional 
wisdom, at least until recently, took for granted in developed countries. These include some of 
the legal and institutional underpinnings of a modern market-based system, such as sound 
accounting rules, well-functioning market ‘gatekeepers’ (auditors, credit rating agencies etc.), 
active and liquid markets, and an effective court system. The building blocks can be analyzed 
sequentially (i.e. from information disclosure to market reaction to bank response), but they also 
form a feedback loop with each other. While opinions might differ as to whether they constitute 
the ‘right’ set of building blocks
7, greater importance should be placed on whether the 
framework captures reasonably well all the relevant pieces of an effective MD architecture.   
 
A host of empirical studies generally support the proposition that market participants can 
differentiate the riskiness of banks and price them accordingly in environments where 
idiosyncratic risk dominates, although evidence on their ability to influence bank behavior is 
mixed
8. The literature also suggests that there are a number of regulatory policies that can be 
undertaken to address impediments to MD
9 – for example: 
  lowering the cost of private monitoring, e.g. via additional disclosure requirements as 
well as more reliable and timely information 
  raising the incentives for monitoring by market participants, e.g. increasing the cost of 
private bank failure by redesigning safety nets and credibly committing not to not bail out 
failing firms 
  increasing the incentives for bank management to respond to market signals, e.g. by 
strengthening corporate governance arrangements. 
 
The above framework captures these issues and makes explicit the need for a comprehensive 
and consistent set of regulatory policies to support MD – in fact, a given regulatory policy can be 
relevant across more than one building blocks. For example, the design of safety nets influences 
the incentives of market participants to monitor banks (block 2), the consequent price 
movements in bank instruments (block 3), the incentives of insiders to change their behavior 
(block 4), and possibly the type/amount of information that is disclosed to the market (block 1). 
                                                 
7 For example, one could argue that credit rating agencies belong to the second and/or third building block. The 
reason they have been included in the first block is that they have preferential access to confidential information by 
the banks that they rate, and can be therefore viewed as ‘insiders’ rather than purely external market participants. 
8 See Tarullo (August 2008) for a recent review of the literature. 
9 Llewellyn (March 2005) separates impediments to MD into those that are structural and those that are policy-
induced. According to him, the former are more applicable to developing countries, and include the lack of 
information, the presence of state-owned banks, greater forbearance, more extensive deposit insurance schemes, and 
smaller capital markets.  
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III.  Financial Crisis Failures  
 
Inadequate Market Signals 
 
As has been pointed out by various critics, market prices and credit ratings did not provide 
adequate or timely signals to banks (or their supervisors) on the buildup of risks during the ‘good 
times’. By contrast, once the crisis hit, and particularly after the U.S. authorities allowed the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 allegedly in an attempt to restore MD, market 
participants punished the prices of bank securities harshly. 
 
In order to validate this criticism, information was collected on the evolution since 2006 in 
the prices of different types of instruments – equity, debt and 5-year credit default swaps (CDS) 
– for a small set of U.S. banks (Citigroup, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers). Those banks were 
selected because they took, at least with hindsight, excessive risks and the financial crisis caused 
them to fail (Lehman Brothers, September 2008) or to be rescued via arranged takeovers (Bear 
Stearns, March 2008 – sold to J.P. Morgan) and ad hoc government support packages (Citigroup, 
November 2008 and February 2009). As can be seen in Table 1, the securities used in the 
analysis (whenever available) span the capital structure of a typical large U.S. bank, and their 
different risk characteristics allow a comparison of their price sensitivity. 
 













































Source: CreditSights (29 March 2009). 
 
The movement of prices prior to and during the crisis, both across different instruments of 
the same bank and for each of the selected bank instruments vis-à-vis a suitable market 
benchmark, was analyzed. Market benchmarks were created by forming a composite (simple 
average) of similar instruments by appropriate peers for each of the selected banks. In the case of 
Citigroup, the peers were two other large U.S. diversified banks (JP Morgan and Bank of 
America), while in the case of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers the peers were the three other 
major stand-alone U.S. investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch). The 
purpose was twofold: (1) to identify the most risk sensitive instruments that provided the earliest 
warning signals; (2) to ascertain whether those price signals captured the bank’s idiosyncratic 
behavior as opposed to broader market-wide price movements. The objective of this exercise was 
to establish whether (and when) MD began to function for these banks in the crisis. 
 
Appendix I contains graphs depicting the evolution in the price of different instruments for 
the three banks and their respective market benchmarks since early 2006. Appendix II describes  
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the analysis that was used to determine whether (and when) the price divergence of different 
bank instruments from their market benchmarks became statistically significant, while Appendix 
III shows the main characteristics of the securities that were used. The analysis is subject to 
several qualifications (choice of time period and of suitable market benchmarks, comparability 
of similar instruments across different banks, assumption of normally behaved prices of different 
instruments etc.) and additional data (e.g. traded volume information by type of instrument) and 
more sophisticated statistical techniques can be employed to corroborate and expand on the 
results. However, the analysis presented in this paper is sufficient for the purposes of drawing a 
few broad conclusions about price behavior and market signals. 
 
The main stylized facts can be summarized as follows. First, the prices of some bank 
instruments, including market benchmarks, only began to decline in the second half of 2007 and 
accelerated their downward spiral following the events of March 2008 (collapse and takeover of 
Bear Stearns) and September 2008 (conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, government intervention in AIG). As can be expected, the timing of the 
initial price declines corresponds roughly to the steep drop in quarterly earnings results 
announced by these banks
10. Second, once the additional risks of the three banks started to 
become apparent to market participants, there was some differentiation in the prices of their 
instruments compared to their respective benchmarks. This differentiation started to take place a 
few months in advance of their eventual failure/intervention date. Finally, the prices of CDS, 
equity and (sometimes) hybrid securities generally responded faster and more strongly than the 
prices for subordinated and senior debt. In fact, in some cases (e.g. Lehman Brothers), the price 
of the senior debt remained close to par and to the market benchmark until the very end. 
 
Breakdowns in the Various Building Blocks 
 
The above stylized facts remain inevitably open to different interpretations, some of which 
are inconsistent with the basic premise of MD that markets are efficient and that market prices 
are good indicators of economic value. In particular, for those who believe that risks accumulate 
during ‘good times’ and only manifest themselves during ‘bad times’, it is difficult to dispute the 
notion that the efficient market hypothesis is wrong and that MD failed to exert itself sufficiently 
early. On the other hand, one could argue that markets are dynamic, that other banks had 
similarly risky positions as the banks under analysis prior to the crisis, and that it was only the 
bad decisions subsequently taken by the management of these three banks (e.g. not pulling back 
from risky activities when it became obvious and prudent to do so) that was the trigger for action 
by market participants. In any case, the two views are not necessarily inconsistent, since the 
former is concerned more with assessing the overall absolute level of risk in the financial system 
while the latter is focused primarily on the relative risk of the three banks vis-à-vis their peers. 
 
Once the crisis took hold, MD seems to have played its role as expected (and perhaps more 
than desired), with banks perceived to be weaker being punished more severely than stronger 
ones. However, the crisis has also demonstrated that MD can be a fairly crude ex post instrument 
and that attempting to re-impose discipline in the middle of a crisis (as is alleged to have been 
the case for Lehman Brothers) can have significant adverse repercussions to overall market 
                                                 
10 The banks under analysis began to report significant earnings declines either for the second quarter of 2007 (Bear 
Stearns) or for the third quarter of that year (Lehman Brothers, Citigroup).  
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confidence. Using the aforementioned framework, one can analyze the possible breakdowns 
across the various building blocks that explain the way that MD has worked. 
 
The literature on MD assigns great importance to block 1 on information and disclosure. This 
emphasis is in response to the perception that past banking problems have partly stemmed from a 
lack of transparency on the true level of exposures and on risk management practices. Under this 
viewpoint, increased disclosure improves monitoring and leads to greater bank incentives to 
control risks (reduction of principal-agent problems).  
 
However, some commentators
11 point out that the information being disclosed was inaccurate 
or incomplete for several reasons. Accounting rules were criticized for allowing banks to hide 
exposures off-balance sheet via the use of special-purpose vehicles, as well as for exacerbating 
procyclicality in bank profits (i.e. overvaluations during good times and excessive write downs 
during the crisis) by promoting inappropriate marking-to-market of assets and discouraging loan 
loss provisioning across the cycle. Financial reporting standards were deemed excessively 
complex and focused on quantity, as opposed to quality, of bank disclosures. Regulatory 
standards (e.g. Basel II’s capital rules) promoted procyclical market-based measures of risk and 
permitted risk disclosures and metrics that were in retrospect insufficiently granular or 
comparable across banks. Banks used risk methodologies and measurement models that did not 
capture the true amount of risk (e.g. as in structured finance). Finally, credit ratings provided 
little warning to market participants – in fact, as can be seen in the graphs in Appendix I, market 
pricing remained consistently ahead of the ratings provided by the credit rating agencies (CRAs). 
 
An active set of diverse stakeholders is an essential precondition for effective monitoring and 
signaling under blocks 2 and 3 of the MD framework. Shareholders can influence the behavior of 
bank management through various means, including the market for corporate control (mergers 
and acquisitions)
12, stock price (‘voting with their feet’), corporate governance arrangements 
(e.g. compensation packages), and the court system (e.g. director liability and investor protection 
rules). Their actions can also serve as warning signals to the authorities and thereby help 
precipitate supervisory actions to discipline bank management. According to the MD literature, it 
is uninsured debt holders who represent the most important bank monitors because of the 
asymmetric payout nature of their contracts (no upside benefit), making them less tolerant to 
excessive risk-taking
13. Their exposure can take various forms, including bonds, interbank 
placements, derivatives contracts, and uninsured deposits. They can influence bank behavior 
through price/quantity effects, collateral/margin arrangements, and debt covenants, and can be 
privy to better information because of additional private disclosure requirements.  
                                                 
11 See, for example, Brunnermeier et al. (January 2009). 
12 However, the market for corporate control has historically been a rarely-used mechanism – compared with other 
sectors – to exercise MD for poorly-performing banks. As with the bankruptcy process, takeover of banks is 
significantly more complex than takeovers in other industries. Hostile takeovers are extremely rare (especially for 
large banks) and bank supervisors typically need to approve any transactions. 
13 The option-like character of equity holdings (limited liability and residual claims) implies that shareholders may 
not be relied upon to exercise discipline if the increase in the risk of failure is offset by increased probability of 
higher return, as in the case of the so-called ‘gambling for resurrection’ strategy. However, the equity market 
remains an important signaling tool and is often used as an early warning system for risk-taking behavior – for 
example, popular credit risk models employed nowadays by trading desks (e.g. Moody’s KMV) use equity prices to 




However, market participants failed to sufficiently monitor or react to banks’ risk-taking 
behavior ahead of the crisis, partly due to the procyclical and incomplete information
 that they 
had been receiving
14. In fact, quite the opposite seems to have happened – shareholders actively 
encouraged banks to take on greater risks in order to match or exceed the performance of their 
peers
15. This type of herding behavior is well-exemplified by the statement of former Citigroup 
CEO Chuck Prince in an interview with the Financial Times in July 2007: “when the music 
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But, as long as the music is playing, you 
have got to get up and dance. We are still dancing”.  
 
Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that debt holders relied excessively on credit rating 
agencies and on the CDS market to monitor and control their bank exposures, both of which 
proved unreliable in retrospect. Even though some of the banks ultimately failed or were 
intervened because they were rapidly becoming illiquid
16, there is little evidence that large 
uninsured depositors or counterparties were taking pre-emptive action by moving their holdings 
or reducing their exposures significantly in advance of such events
17.  
 
There is also some evidence that market participants’ incentives to monitor and discipline 
banks were blunted by too-big-to-fail considerations, especially after the arranged takeover of 
Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan in which the debt holders and CDS counterparts of the former were 
protected. In fact, the aforementioned difference in pricing behavior across different bank 
securities may not be solely due to their position in the capital structure but could also reflect the 
market’s expectation of likely government support to prevent the default of systemically 
important banks. This perception may have given comfort to the holders of those classes of 
securities (e.g. senior debt) that would only lose if such an event materialized; this is most 
obvious in the case of Lehman Brothers, where the price of senior debt remained fairly steady 
throughout the crisis until it collapsed upon the bank’s default. The absence of a resolution 
regime for systemically important non-bank financial institutions in the U.S., including for bank 
holding companies, may also have led market participants to expect the authorities to keep such 
institutions afloat. By contrast, holders of capital instruments that would lose value even if no 
bank default took place – such as preferred shares – were more risk sensitive as illustrated by 
price movements in those instruments. 
 
Finally, the MD literature recognizes the importance of governance (building block 4) as a 
necessary factor to align the interests of principals (stakeholders) and agents (senior management 
and the board of directors). In the specific case of banks, strengthening governance is essential 
given their opaque nature and public interest entity status, and is a ‘first line of defense’ in 
                                                 
14 More disturbingly, it seems that key counterparties did not sufficiently monitor and discipline banks even in cases 
where the relevant information was publicly available. See, for example, Frankel (December 2009) for an analysis of 
the 2007 failure of New Century Financial. 
15 Hellwig (November 2008) argues that “market discipline as a mechanism of corporate governance [by 
shareholders] is intrinsically biased in favor of strategies that involve greater risk-taking”.  
16 For example, the demise of Bear Stearns prior to its arranged takeover has been attributed to the decision of other 
market players not to roll over short-term repos with it, resulting in a rapid loss of working capital. 
17 Information on the evolution of deposits (Citigroup) and reverse repos (Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers) over 
this time period was also collected. However, such information is less frequent (it is mostly reported on a quarterly 
basis) and did not provide sufficient granularity or direction to draw definitive conclusions.   
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dealing with prudential problems. Good governance provides incentives for bank ‘insiders’ to 
exercise appropriate oversight and to disclose adequate, timely and reliable information on 
performance and risk exposures that allow MD to work more effectively (block 1). The large 
number of stakeholders places higher expectations on bank boards and calls for an elaborate 
system of ‘checks and balances’. 
 
However, the crisis has exposed deep governance failures. Following Ard and Berg 
(forthcoming), they can be categorized into four broad areas. First, there were failures in risk 
governance – as the Senior Supervisors Group (6 March 2008) point out, risk management 
systems were deficient, relevant organizational functions were weak, and there was limited board 
oversight of risks, resulting in their mis-measurement and mispricing. Second, incentive-based 
compensation was excessive as executives were seen to “reach for short-term yield” at the 
expense of long term firm stability and value. Third, as Nestor Advisors (April 2009) mention in 
their analysis of six investment banks, boards of directors were not as independent or qualified as 
governance codes required. Finally, institutional shareholders remained mostly inactive and 
preferred to “vote with their feet” rather that striving to improve governance practices in 
financial institutions. As a result, boards and senior management did not adequately understand, 
monitor or control the risks that their institutions were taking. Moreover, the market signals that 





IV.  Improving Market Discipline 
 
Announced Policy Measures 
 
The regulatory response of the international community has been sizeable and multi-pronged. 
Several of the problems that were identified and described in the previous section are currently 
being addressed via various reform measures or proposals
18. Although such proposals have not 
been discussed as part of a ‘MD solution’, they are in fact ways to strengthen MD using the logic 
of the aforementioned framework. 
 
With regards to block 1, the crisis has accelerated the process of revising accounting 
standards and ensuring greater convergence across different standard-setters (International 
Accounting Standards Board and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board). These involve 
revisions in three main areas: introducing more flexibility in loan loss provisioning to allow 
forward-looking through-the-cycle approaches (e.g. expected loss provisioning), tightening rules 
on the consolidation of off-balance sheet exposures, and clarifying (mostly by limiting) the 
application of fair value accounting for different types of financial instruments. Reforms in 
financial reporting are also being undertaken with a view to reducing complexity. 
 
Regulatory proposals regarding CRAs aim to address their demonstrated failings in 
structured finance as well as to increase their oversight so that it is commensurate to their 
reliance for regulatory purposes
19. This includes efforts to improve the transparency and quality 
of the ratings process as well as to restrict and manage conflicts of interest. Measures to address 
the over-reliance of supervisors and market participants on ratings are also under review 
although, as they currently stand, they will likely do little to change the business model or the 
cartelized industry structure. 
 
The crisis has intensified the debate on the adequacy of Basel II, and has prompted the Basel 
Committee to propose measures to strengthen specific elements of all Pillars of the framework. 
These include, for example, tightening capital charges for certain types of exposures (re-
securitizations, trading book, over-the-counter derivatives etc.) and raising the quality of 
regulatory capital under Pillar 1, strengthening the guidelines for supervisory review under Pillar 
2, expanding risk disclosures under Pillar 3, as well as introducing a leverage ratio and minimum 
liquidity standards
20. However, the fundamental philosophy of the Accord – namely, reliance on 
banks’ internal risk models and on market prices for determining regulatory capital requirements 
– remains unchanged. 
 
With regards to blocks 2 and 3, the policy responses that have been announced to-date have 
ambiguous effects on the incentives of market participants to better monitor excessive risk-taking 
by banks. On the one hand, proposals to address the moral hazard stemming from systemically 
important financial institutions that are “too big/interconnected to fail” – particularly the 
establishment of a resolution regime that would allow them to be wound down efficiently – 
                                                 
18 See Stephanou (June 2009) and the Financial Stability Board (7 November 2009) for recent overviews of the 
reform agenda. 
19 See Katz et al. (October 2009) for an overview of regulatory reforms for CRAs. 
20 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (July 2009a and b, and December 2009) for details.  
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should make their uninsured creditors more risk sensitive and perhaps incentivize such 
institutions to better control their risk-taking. On the other hand, however, the significant 
expansion in deposit insurance coverage and lender-of-last resort facilities during the crisis raises 
the question of longer-term changes to their design. Some changes that have already been 
introduced are likely to become permanent such as, for example, higher deposit coverage and the 
elimination of the co-insurance component. This would blunt the incentives of depositors to 
monitor bank behavior. Moreover, the interplay between the new macro-prudential framework 
and safety net design – in particular, how to clearly demarcate the boundaries of safety nets 
under a broader regulatory perimeter and how to price them appropriately – is still undefined.  
 
With regards to block 4, bank governance  reforms have primarily focused on executive 
compensation plans, with international bodies developing principles and standards on sound 
compensation practices and asking national supervisory authorities and private firms to 
implement them
21. A more important role for risk managers as well as greater independence, 
stronger qualification standards, and greater involvement in risk management issues by board 
members, are other regulatory solutions that may be introduced to address this problem. 
Providing a greater role to bank shareholders in executive remuneration and board composition 
matters has also been proposed, but it remains a controversial issue. 
 
Limitations and the Way Forward 
 
Whether the proposed reforms are actually sufficient to address the failures of MD in this 
crisis can only be assessed in years to come – in fact, the true testing of the new framework can 
only take place once the crisis measures are rolled back and the regulatory reforms are 
implemented. However, it is unlikely that the reforms will be able to effectively address what is 
conceivably the greatest weakness of the concept, namely its inability to properly respond to the 
buildup of systemic, as opposed to idiosyncratic, risk in the financial system
22. This topic has not 
been given sufficient attention in the MD literature, which has tended to focus primarily on 
assessing whether market participants are able to identify and punish individual weak banks. The 
financial crisis illustrates that MD cannot be relied upon sufficiently to tackle systemic risks in a 
preemptive way that would prevent the need for disruptive and costly ex post market 
adjustments. It is therefore questionable whether proposals to involve market participants in 
pricing and/or providing insurance against systemic risks would be very effective, although a lot 
will depend on the nature of the incentives provided and their risk-sharing properties. 
 
In fact, some commentators
23 argue that there is an inherent trade-off between MD and 
financial stability. Their argument is that even in an ideal world where all the building blocks of 
the MD framework work harmoniously together, the effectiveness of the concept is limited to 
mitigating idiosyncratic risks associated with principal-agent problems and moral hazard. This 
does not necessarily align the incentives of individual market players with those of the entire 
                                                 
21 See Financial Stability Forum (April 2009) and Financial Stability Board (September 2009) for details. 
22 The corollary of this proposition, as stated by the U.K. FSA (March 2009), is that “it is quite possible, for 
instance, that efficient and liquid markets provide useful and accurate price signals as to the relative attractiveness 
of different equities or credits even if the overall level of prices is subject to irrational overshoots”. 
23 See de la Torre and Ize (February 2009) for a description of the characteristics and contrasting prudential 
implications arising from the existence of different financial paradigms. See also chapter 8 of Inter-American 
Development Bank (2004).  
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financial system if there are un-internalized externalities and mood swings (“animal spirits”). In 
fact, the reverse may take place – namely, policies aimed at mitigating the problems of 
externalities and mood swings may actually exacerbate agency problems. For example, while 
MD depends on the lack of an extensive safety net that would minimize monitoring incentives by 
market participants, financial stability can be enhanced via the introduction of deposit insurance 
that reduces the possibility of systemic problems from bank runs. If that is the case, then the 
optimum amount of MD may well depend on the types of shocks that affect the banking system 
and the extent to which problems are idiosyncratic or systemic in nature. In the latter situation, 




While the role of MD in the design of macro-prudential regulation appears to be largely 
constrained, more can be done on the micro-prudential side. However, progress can only be 
achieved if one recognizes that the building blocks of MD extend well beyond transparency and 
disclosure. This would imply significant reforms in Pillar 3 of Basel II, which implicitly assumes 
that the preconditions already exist for the market to utilize information effectively to exercise 
discipline. A reconstituted Pillar 3 would need to include policies to support MD across all the 
building blocks of the framework, including appropriate regulation and oversight of the various 
financial ‘gatekeepers’ (e.g. external bank auditors, CRAs etc.), market participants and 
discipline mechanisms (e.g. collateral/margin requirements, bank resolution etc.), and bank 
governance arrangements (e.g. remuneration rules, board composition criteria etc.). Unless such 
reforms are undertaken, Pillar 3 will remain the weakest pillar of the Basel II Framework since it 
suffers from too many structural limitations to be of much use for MD purposes. 
 
Two examples of potential reforms to promote MD as part of a micro-prudential framework 
are the creation of a specialized convertible debt instrument (‘contingent capital’) that could 
provide clearer signals on bank riskiness, and the increased use of market information by 
banking supervisors as an early warning signal to improve the identification of troubled banks 
and to act earlier to resolve budding problems.  
 
Several academics and financial economists have proposed in the past the mandatory 
periodic issuance of subordinated debt by banks as a way to promote MD
25. Under this proposal, 
banks would be required to regularly issue a small amount of debt with a minimum maturity that 
would also qualify as regulatory capital
26. The inability to regularly issue this debt, or the level of 
yield demanded by investors, would signal the bank’s riskiness to supervisors as well as increase 
its cost of funding as a disciplining device. However, as previously mentioned, the price of 
                                                 
24 In the words of Persaud (July 2009), “One reason that market discipline was seen as such an important pillar in 
the pre-crisis approach to banking regulation was the implicit model that regulators had in mind: financial crashes 
occur randomly as a result of a bad institution failing, and that failure becomes systemic. The historical experience 
is rather different: crashes follow booms. In the boom almost all financial institutions look good, and in the bust 
almost all look bad. Differentiation is poor. The current crisis is another instance of this all-too-familiar cycle”. 
25 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Department of the Treasury (December 2000), 
Benink and Wihlborg (August 2001), VanHoose (February 2007), and Tarullo (August 2008). 
26 Additional features could include the debt’s frequent rollover by banks (to provide primary market signals and 
therefore avoid any secondary market illiquidity problems), its purchase solely by independent institutional investors 
(as opposed to the banks themselves or the retail public), and a ceiling on the yield that can be accepted (to avoid 
situations whereby a junk bond yield has a sufficiently high coupon to compensate the risk of default).  
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subordinated debt for the three banks under analysis generally adjusted relatively late compared 
to equity and some types of hybrid capital, both because of their respective rank in the capital 
structure and because of the fact that a bank generally has to fail – and is therefore subject to too-
big-to-fail considerations – before the holders of such instruments lose out.  
 
The market’s focus on tangible common equity and tier 1 capital, as opposed to total 
regulatory capital, as an indicator of bank financial strength during the crisis has prompted a 
revision of the quality of capital rules by the Basel Committee. One solution would be for 
standard-setters to support the adoption of a mandatory, standardized convertible debt instrument 
– at least for systemically important financial institutions – that would automatically convert to 
common equity when specific pre-defined triggers are met (e.g. bank losses that exceed a certain 
threshold or breach minimum regulatory capital requirements) but before the bank reaches the 
failure point and needs to be resolved or saved. This type of hybrid instrument could be included 
in a revised definition of regulatory capital. In addition to providing greater ex post private sector 
risk-bearing capacity during the ‘bad times’, it could potentially also provide useful ex ante price 
signals on bank riskiness. This is because investors in such instruments would be incentivized to 
better monitor banks since the probability of government intervention to save them would 
presumably be significantly reduced
27.   
 
Finally, there has been some discussion in the literature about the use of market information 
by supervisors in their bank assessment process. The price behavior of the different instruments 
for the three banks under analysis in this paper indicates that such information would have been 
useful and would have allowed supervisors a head start to develop suitable contingency plans. It 
is unclear at this stage whether (and how broadly) such information is actually being used by 
supervisory agencies
28, but one way to further promote its use would be to explicitly include 
monitoring of the various forms of MD mechanisms for banks – including changes in market 
prices/quantities of various bank instruments, collateral/margin requirements etc. – as part of the 
supervisory review process in Pillar 2 of Basel II.  
 
 
                                                 
27 See Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation (April 2009) and Flannery (October 2009) for recent 
proposals on the use of contingent capital for large and distressed financial institutions. Similar proposals were 
floated even before the crisis – see, for example, Flannery (November 2002) on the introduction of ‘reverse 
convertible debentures’ as a type of contingent capital instrument to strengthen MD. 
28 Hamalainen et a. (2008) review the evidence on Northern Rock and conclude that U.K. supervisory authorities 
could have been alerted earlier on the basis of equity market signals.  
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V.  Conclusions 
 
The broad global trends that have accompanied the growth in financial markets and the 
increased complexity and size of financial institutions over the last few decades have made MD 
an increasingly important tool to complement official supervision. This has been recognized by 
policymakers who have incorporated it in their prudential frameworks in recent years.  
 
While the concept itself is intuitive, the mechanisms by which MD can function under 
different financial system structures and institutional contexts remain unclear. In an attempt to 
overcome this problem and to facilitate the analysis, a MD framework based on the existing 
literature has been developed in this paper. The framework covers areas where conventional 
wisdom, at least until recently, took for granted in developed countries, and makes explicit the 
need for a comprehensive and consistent set of regulatory policies to support MD. 
 
The paper draws some lessons from the crisis by analyzing the evolution in the prices of 
different types of instruments – equity, debt and CDS – for three major U.S. banks. It shows how 
MD, at least as proxied by the prices of those instruments, failed to exert itself sufficiently early 
to prevent the buildup of systemic risks prior to the crisis. Of course, once the crisis took hold, 
MD seems to have played its role as expected (and perhaps more than desired), with banks 
perceived to be weaker being punished more severely than stronger ones.  
 
Using the aforementioned framework, one can analyze the possible breakdowns across the 
various MD building blocks and review the regulatory responses of the international community 
to these problems. It is an open question, and one that the paper does not tackle, whether these 
problems actually became worse as a result of the de-regulatory trends of the past two decades. 
However, what is clear in retrospect is that too much faith had been placed on MD as a 
prudential tool, and that the crisis has showed its limitations. 
 
Whether the proposed reforms are actually sufficient to address the failures of MD in this 
crisis can only be assessed in years to come. However, it is unlikely that the reforms will be able 
to adequately address the inability of MD to respond to the buildup of systemic, as opposed to 
idiosyncratic, risk in the financial system. In fact, there may even be an inherent trade-off 
between MD and financial stability to the extent that policies to promote the former may 
exacerbate problems with the latter. If that is the case, then the optimum amount of MD may 
well depend on the types of shocks that affect the banking system and the extent to which 
problems are idiosyncratic or systemic in nature.  
 
While the role of MD in the design of macro-prudential regulation appears to be largely 
constrained, more can be done on the micro-prudential side. Recognition of the need for a more 
expansive view of MD would imply significant reforms in the way that the concept is currently 
treated in the prudential framework, which focuses predominantly on transparency and 
disclosure. Two examples of additional reforms to promote MD are the creation of a specialized 
convertible debt instrument (‘contingent capital’) that could provide clearer signals on bank 
riskiness, and the increased use of market information in supervisory processes to improve the 
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Source: Bloomberg. Note: The green vertical lines indicate the date of the bankruptcy/intervention event for each bank.  
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Appendix II: Statistical Analysis of Bank Instrument Prices 
 
To test more formally whether (and when) the prices of financial instruments provided signals 
that differentiated Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Lehman Brothers from their healthier peers, a 
simple methodology is employed that is reminiscent of an event study. We first estimate the pre-
crisis relationship between the daily change in the price of each instrument for these banks and 
the daily change in the price of the comparable market benchmark instruments over a time 
window from 2 January 2006 until 30 June 2007. We then use the model estimates to predict 
daily changes for the period starting on the 1 July 2007 up until the failure or intervention event 
of the bank being analyzed. 
 
Under this approach, if market participants were not able to differentiate the additional riskiness 
of the three banks, the relationship that was calculated for the pre-crisis period would remain 
relatively stable until their failure/intervention event. In such a case, one would observe: 1) that 
the variability of the daily prediction errors would remain relatively stable; and 2) that the 
cumulative sum of these errors would be statistically close to zero. If, however, market 
participants started to differentiate the riskiness of these banks and reflect it in the prices of at 
least some of their instruments, one would begin to observe the opposite effect, i.e. increasing 
variance of daily prediction errors and of their cumulative sums. 
 
The pre-crisis model that was used to create the predictions is specified as follows: 
 
ift ift if if ift Benchmark r       ,   ( 1 )  
 
where  i denotes the instrument (equity, CDS, preferred, trust preferred, senior debt, and 
subordinated debt), f denotes the firm (Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Lehman), and t denotes the 
trading day. As previously mentioned, the benchmark group for Bear Stearns and Lehman 
consists of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch, while JP Morgan and Bank of 
America form the benchmark for Citigroup. The failure/intervention events are 14 March 2008 
for Bear Stearns, 15 September 2008 for Lehman, and 24 November 2008 for Citigroup. 
 
First, we calculate rolling standard deviations of the daily prediction errors over a thirty trading 
day window up to one trading day before the intervention event. An increasing series suggests 
that market participants began to distinguish the higher riskiness of the banks under analysis, 
thereby leading to a breakdown in the estimated pre-crisis relationship (Figure A-II.1). 
 
Second, by making certain simplifying assumptions regarding the statistical properties of the 
various instrument prices, we are able to test whether (and at what time period) the divergence in 
the prices of the 3 banks under analysis from their benchmarks becomes statistically significant. 
This is done by testing whether the normalized cumulative sum of prediction errors is 
significantly different from zero. At a 95 percent confidence level, this implies that the size of 
the normalized cumulative sum of prediction errors must be larger than 1.96. Figure A-II.2 
shows the cumulative sum of prediction errors and Figure A-II.3 shows the respective t-statistics 
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Figure A-II.3 t-Statistics on whether cumulative prediction errors are significantly 
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Appendix III: Bank Securities Used in the Analysis 
 
Since the prices of the same type of instrument for each bank tend to move closely 
together, the results discussed in this paper should not in principle vary significantly by 
the choice of specific instruments that were selected for analysis. The following bank 
instruments were chosen based on a few key criteria, such as issuance date (instruments 
issued prior to 2006 are preferable as they cover the entire sample period of analysis), 
size (larger issues are preferable to smaller ones since they tend to be more liquid), and 
comparability of terms between the instrument of the bank and of its benchmark. Of 
course, as can be seen below, the characteristics of the same instrument can sometimes 
differ substantially across banks. 
 
Senior Unsecured Debt 











Bear Stearns  073902CE6  7  4.5%  1,100  2010 
Lehman 
Brothers  52517PA35 5  4.5%  1,000  2010 
Merrill Lynch  EF0441602  5  4.79%  1,300  2010 
Morgan 
Stanley  61746SBS7 5  5.05%  2,000  2011 
Goldman 
Sachs  38143UAW1 10  5%  1,250 2014 
Citigroup 172967CT6  30  5.85%  1,000  2034 
JP Morgan   ED8252089  10  4.75%  1,250  2015 
Bank of 















Bear Stearns  073902PN2  10  5.55%  1,000  2017 
Lehman 
Brothers  524908UB4 10  5.75%  1,250  2017 
Merrill Lynch  59022CAB9  20  6.22%  1,350  2026 
Morgan 
Stanley  61748AAE6 10  4.75%  4,000 2014 
Goldman 
Sachs  38143YAC7 30  6.45%  1,500 2036 
Citigroup 172967CQ2  10  5%  4,083  2014 
JP Morgan  46625HAT7  10  5.75%  1,750  2013 
Bank of 




Perpetual Preferred Stock 











Bear Stearns  46625H712  Perpetual  5.72%  200  - 
Lehman 
Brothers  524908720 Perpetual  6.5%  300  - 
Merrill Lynch  060505591  Perpetual  Libor+75bps  240  - 
Morgan 
Stanley  61747S504 Perpetual Libor+70bps 1,100  - 
Goldman 
Sachs  38144X609 Perpetual Libor+75bps  200  - 
Citigroup 172967572  Perpetual  8.125%  3,715  - 
JP Morgan   46625H621  Perpetual  8.625%  1,800  - 
Bank of 
America  060505831 Perpetual  6.204%  825  - 
 
 
Trust Preferred Stock 











Bear Stearns  07384T206  -  7.8%  263  - 
Lehman 
Brothers  52520X208 -  6.24%  200  - 
Merrill Lynch  59021K205  -  7.28%  850  - 
Morgan 
Stanley  617462205 -  6.25%  620  - 
Goldman 
Sachs  38143VAA7 30  6.345%  2,750  - 
Citigroup 17306N203  -  7.125%  1,150  - 
JP Morgan   481228203  -  6.35%  500  - 
Bank of 
America  055187207 -  7% 575  - 
 